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1. Abstract 
 
This paper will discuss the rise of equivalence as an assessed precondition for third countries to access 
the European Union financial markets.  Following the financial crisis there has been a raft of EU financial 
regulation, often with extraterritorial reach.  The Alternative Investment Fund Manager’s Directive and 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation will be considered in detail, after which 
consideration of the evidence provided by ESMA in relation to the functioning of the AIFMD passport 
within the EU and the extension of the AIFMD passport outside the EU will be outlined.  Despite the 
lack of evidence to suggest that the parallel banking system either caused or exacerbated the financial 
crisis, regulation of hedge and private equity funds and over the counter derivatives intensified following 
2009 and access to the European markets could be severely curtailed by the extraterritorial imposition 
of EU regulations.  Ostensibly the new regulations have been designed to prevent systemic risk 
spreading to the system from poorly regulated third countries, and to mark a departure from home state 
control.  However, having examined the Jersey and Guernsey assessments, it will be argued that the 
prevention of systemic risk is no longer the main concern when assessing equivalent regimes, where 
market access and reciprocity are key. ESMA will also be shown to have considerable power in 
determining whether equivalence is determined against rules or principles. 
2. Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive  
2.1 Rationale and History 
The Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive (“AIFMD”) forms part of the European Union’s 
regulatory response to the financial crisis of 2007/8, and “aims at establishing common requirements 
governing the authorisation and supervision of AIFMs in order to provide a coherent approach to the 
related risks and their impact on investors and markets in the union”.1  The legislation was born of the 
de Larosiere report2  which recommended that the parallel banking system be considered as a possible 
source of systemic impact3, despite acknowledging that in their view the hedge fund industry did not 
“play a major role in the emergence of the crisis.”4 Prior to the financial crisis and the recommendations 
of de Larosiere the parallel banking system was not deregulated, and was subject to the first Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive and the market abuse regime.  Moloney notes that in 2010 80% of 
hedge funds and 60% of private equity funds were regulated by the UK’s Financial Services Authority5.  
However, despite this, de Larosiere was concerned about leverage, a lack of transparency and banks 
with retail customers engaging in proprietary trading without capital requirements being enforced.  
These opinions form the basis of Recommendation 7 of the report.  Prior attempts to regulate the 
                                                          
1Council and Parliament Directive 2011/61/EU of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and 
amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 
[2011] OJ L174/1 Recital (2) 
2 Jacques de Larosiere et al, ‘The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU’, (Brussels, 25 February 
2009) 
3 Ibid. Para 86 
4 Ibid. 
5 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, (OUP, 3rd Edition, 2014), p. 275 
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industry had been made by France and Germany prior to the crisis, with France’s Sarkozy seeking to 
tax hedge funds in 2006 and Germany calling for codes on conduct and transparency requirements at 
the May 2007 G8 meeting, where he met with transatlantic opposition6.  It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that once a recommendation had been made for EU wide regulation, Germany and France were eager 
to ensure that it came to fruition in the form of a Directive.  It is worth noting de Larosiere’s stipulation 
though, that the US should adopt a similar set of measures7 and any regulation should be both 
‘appropriate’ and ‘proportionate’8.   
The AIFMD was entered into the Official Journal on the 8th June 2011, with a view to being fully 
transposed into Member States law by July 2013, with a transitional period until July 2014.  However, 
in reality the Directive did not become transposed into all Member States until the end of July 2014 so 
has currently been in effect for 2 years. 
Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) are classified as all Collective Investment Schemes not covered 
by UCITS (Recital 3), which includes hedge funds and private equity funds but also covers real estate 
funds and venture capital.  AIFs are by their nature not available to the retail market.  The AIFMD is a 
wide ranging piece of legislation which regulates all AIFMs based in the EU, whether the funds they 
manage are marketed in the EU or not, and any AIFMs who seek to market Non-EU AIFs in the EU to 
European investors.   However, the rules are complicated and essentially provide for 4 situations: EU 
AIFMs managing an EU AIF; an EU AIFM managing a Non EU AIF; a Non EU AIFM managing an EU 
AIF; and finally a Non EU AIFM managing a Non EU AIF (together, the “Fund Classes”). 
2.2 Marketing of EU AIFS in other EU countries 
Since July 2014 the regime has been effective across Member States for EU based managers 
managing and marketing EU funds, and since that date an EU AIFM requires authorisation from its 
National Competent Authority in order to manage and market an EU or Non EU AIF within its home 
country. Once authorised, EU AIFs can theoretically be marketed across the EU subject to a simple 
notification process.  
At present the EU-wide passport is only open to authorised EU AIFMs marketing EU AIFs.9  The 
remaining three Fund Classes currently have three options if they wish to market an AIF within the 
Union.  The AIFM can either establish a subsidiary fund based in the EU, in which case the passport 
would become available; use the national private placement regime (NPPR), or they can circumvent 
the legislation via reverse solicitation.  At the time of transposal it was anticipated that the passport 
would be extended to the remaining three Fund Classes after July 2015, two years after the passport 
became available to those EU AIFs managed by EU AIFMS.  ESMA was tasked with producing an 
Opinion on the functioning of the passport and the NPPRs and Advice on the extension of the passport 
                                                          
6 Ibid, page 275, n. 505. 
7 Note 2, para. 87 
8 Note 2, Recommendation 7 
9 Note 1, Articles 31,32  
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to third countries by this date10.  Were ESMA to conclude “that there [are] no significant obstacles 
regarding investor protection, market disruption, competition and the monitoring of systemic risk, 
impeding the application of the passport to the marketing of non EU AIFs by EU AIFMS in the Member 
States and the management and/or marketing of AIFs by Non EU AIFMs”11 then it would be required to 
issue positive advice to the Commission.  On receipt of said positive advice, the Commission is required 
to adopt the rules relating to the extension of the passport to third countries12 within three months.   
Accordingly, the earliest that the third country passport was envisaged to be available was October 
2015.  The AIFMD anticipates that the NPPRs will run concurrently with the AIFMD for three years after 
the extension of the passport, therefore allowing a dual regime to run until 2018, at which point all Fund 
Classes would be eligible for the passport and the varying NPPR rules would become defunct.13 
In July 2015 ESMA issued its Advice14 and its Opinion15.  Most notable is the decision of ESMA to only 
consider the extension of the passport to 6 jurisdictions; the United States, Jersey, Guernsey, 
Switzerland, Hong Kong and Singapore.  Therefore, the extension of the passport to third countries has 
become a de facto assessment of equivalence, which was not envisaged in the Directive.  The 
Commission does have statutory authority to extend the deadline for the Advice and Opinion, however, 
as noted by Modrall et al16, the Advice as published creates “significant legal uncertainty”.  Through 
taking a decision to assess the extension of the passport on a country by country basis, ESMA is 
effectively determining whether a third country’s regime can be classed as equivalent.  This being the 
case, extension of the passport may be recommended to third countries in a piecemeal fashion; this is 
not how the legislation was drafted.  There is no legal provision for the passport to be extended in 
tranches, and if positive advice is received, there is no legal provision for the extension of the passport 
to be delayed.  The Chairman of ESMA claims that the timetable for transposition of the AIFMD was 
delayed, stating that “for a number of reasons the Level 2 measures were in fact not published in the 
Official Journal until March 2013, only four months before the transposition deadline”17. 
2.3 ESMA’s Opinion on the functioning of the passport – a harmonised approach? 
The Opinion focuses on the functioning of the passport for EU AIFs managed by EU AIFMs and the 
effectiveness of the NPPR regime for the other three Fund Classes.  The former have to abide by the 
Directive in its entirety and have no other option to market.  All four Fund Classes, whether passported 
                                                          
10 Note 1, Article 67 
11 Note 1, Article 67(4) 
12 Note 1, As detailed in Articles 35 and 37-41 
13 Note 1, Recital 4 
14 ESMA, ‘Advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the application of the AIFMD 
passport to Non-EU AIFMs and AIFs’, 30 July 2015, ESMA/2015/1236 
15 ESMA, ‘Opinion to the European Parliament, Council, Commission and responses to the call for evidence on 
the functioning of the AIFMD EU Passport and of the National Private Placement Regimes’ 30 July 2015 
2015/ESMA/1235 
16 Modrall, Garner and Punia ’10 things to know about the AIFMD Third Country Passport ’ 
<www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/131254/10-things-to-know-about-the-aifmd-third-
country-passport>  accessed August 2015 
17 Steven Maijoor, Speech to the Economic and Public Affairs Committee, 13 October 2015 ESMA/2015/1535 
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or relying on the NPPR are required to produce an annual report, report to the National Competent 
Authority, manage their leverage limits and abide by the regulations governing asset stripping, aimed 
at private equity funds.  Those additional areas which are regulated as requirements for the AIFMD 
passport include capital adequacy requirements, operating conditions, remuneration, conflicts of 
interest, risk management, liquidity management, rules governing securitisation positions, 
organisational requirements, valuation, delegation and the appointment of a depositary.  Furthermore, 
Member States are able to stipulate further requirements for private placement in addition to the minimal 
regime outlined in the AIFMD. 
With regards to the functioning of the passport, ESMA “is of the view that there is insufficient evidence 
to indicate that the AIFMD EU passport has raised major issues in terms of the functioning and 
implementation of the AIFMD framework”18, however, a review of the call for evidence would suggest 
otherwise.  Many respondents reported that, despite the notification procedure detailed in the Directive, 
many Member States had “introduced additional requirements”19, establishing de facto authorisation 
regimes.  The aim of the AIFMD was “establishing common requirements governing the authorisation 
and supervision of AIFMs in order to provide a coherent approach” however, the gold-plating of the 
AIFMD notification process has failed to achieve this.  The fees charged across the Union vary 
significantly, and how they are devised and paid is also a matter of confusion. According to one 
respondent Austria charge 1000 EUR per AIF for processing, plus 220 EUR per sub fund and an 
additional 600 EUR per annum thereafter.  France charge 2000 EUR per processing the passport 
notification and 216 EUR per amendment, Spain initially did not charge fees, but notified in July 2015 
that it intended to apply them in future20. Notwithstanding, the time taken before marketing can 
commence differs between Member States, the passport notification documents which are listed in 
Annex IV to the Directive are not uniformly applied, and not all states have devised and issued 
notification templates.  Where notification templates have been issued, respondents have reported that 
they differ widely, therefore making the provision of one set of information a fallacy.21 One respondent 
noted that “the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland…honour passport notifications from other Member 
States without imposing additional requirements or fees or requiring additional time”22, yet it would 
appear these countries are in the minority.  France has chosen to insist that the AIF appoint a 
correspondent bank for each AIF to be marketed, and whilst the Directive allows for the imposition of 
additional rules for EU AIFMs marketing EU AIFs to retail clients, such additional requirements are not 
acceptable when marketing to professional investors23.   
A lack of definitions within either the Level 1 or Level 2 measures has also been identified.  The meaning 
of ‘marketing’ has been interpreted differently across Member States, resulting in a situation whereby 
AIFMs are unsure whether or when they are required to notify the host state; for example, one state 
                                                          
18 Note 15, Opinion, 1.1, (8) 
19 Note 15, Opinion, Annex 1, 53 
20 Note 15, Opinion, 56 i, ii, v 
21 Note 15, Opinion, 53 
22 Note 15, Opinion, 59 
23 Note 15, Opinion, 93 
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considered marketing to be defined as any contact with a potential investor, whilst another considered 
presentation of the subscription document to the investor as the first element of marketing, at which 
point contact may have been continuing for some time24.  This is of particular importance with regard to 
closed end funds, where documentation is often not produced until likely interest has been evaluated.  
Therefore, in some countries this would be interpreted as marketing and notification to the state would 
have to have been approved (Germany), whereas in the UK this behaviour is considered pre-marketing, 
and is allowed to take place prior to authorisation and notification, as the AIF may not yet be in 
existence.  Other definitions lacking in the Level 2 rules are ‘material change’, which also has to be 
notified to the host state, and what constitutes a professional investor: in France a professional investor 
is an investor of over 100,000 EUR, whereas in Germany any investor of under 200,000 EUR is a semi-
professional investor.  Accordingly, as part of the supposed notification regime, BaFin has requested 
that the rules of the French fund be altered to fit German legal definitions25.  Shockingly, one respondent 
confirms that BaFin charge different amounts depending on the jurisdiction in which the AIF is based26. 
These anomalies, in conjunction with the requests for further information and the imposition of additional 
requirements by host state regulators, do not suggest that the AIFMD passport is working effectively for 
EU AIFMs marketing EU AIFs across the Union.  In addition to the administrative and notification fees 
charged across the EU, and the considerable costs of appointing a centralised paying agent, such legal 
and regulatory uncertainty requires the appointment of external counsel to establish the rules in each 
jurisdiction, which appears to fundamentally contradict the purpose of the primary legislation. 
Indeed, one response to the call for evidence recognised that administrative fees were to be expected, 
but only if they were “reasonable, proportionate and justified”: it seems that AIFMs recognise that the 
passport regime has become “unnecessarily politicised, and many Member States appear to be 
attempting to restrict the free flow of capital with the imposition of ‘border controls’”27. 
2.4 ESMA’s Opinion on the functioning of the NPPRs 
Given that the Directive does not allow for the gold-plating of the passport standard, ignored by many 
Member States, it is unsurprising that the NPPRs also differ greatly, as Member States are free to 
impose any rules they wish in addition to those stipulated in the Directive with which all third country 
AIFs and AIFMS must comply. 
Whilst certain countries have refrained from any additional requirements to those stipulated in the 
AIFMD, namely the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg, other countries have 
exercised the freedom to impose more stringent requirements for national private placement.  In some 
cases these are excessive, and can be seen as a barrier to trade.  Denmark is prohibitively expensive, 
with application fees and annual supervision fees of 5000 EUR apiece, and additional depositary and 
                                                          
24 Note 15, Opinion, 101 
25 Note 15, Opinion, 152 
26 Note 15, Opinion, 77 
27 Note 15, Opinion, 113 
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publication requirements28. Authorisation in Germany may take up to 5 months, requires the 
appointment of a local legal advisor, additional evidence regarding how retail clients will be 
circumnavigated, the appointment of a local tax agent and application and supervision fees of 6,852 
EUR each.  One respondent estimated the total costs of registering in Germany to be in the region of 
60,000 EUR29.  France has introduced an NPPR regime which requires that the Non EU AIFM comply 
with the same rules as the AIFMD, effectively absenting itself from the NPPR process; in this situation, 
surely a fund manager would seek to establish a subsidiary in France, or perhaps elsewhere within the 
Union, in order to have access to the passport.  Italy also has failed to implement an NPPR regime, and 
Spain requires such further information on equivalence of the home state as to be prohibitive.   
The requirements differ vastly across the states, from the imposition of fees to equivalence and 
appointment of various local agents, and establishing the precise rules when looking at a new market 
is also prohibitive.  Annex IV to the AIFMD details the filing requirements, but as there are no 
standardised templates, and Member States differ over the application of the requirements, in effect 
Annex IV is defunct and the individual Member States have individual requirements.  There have been 
no templates issued by ESMA and some states have produced no guidance at all in relation to their 
addition requirements or their Annex IV reporting.  In direct contravention of Article 22, one respondent 
reported the host state demanded equivalent auditing standards30.  Perhaps more astounding, is the 
additional requirement that the third country “grants reciprocal marketing access to funds from that 
Member State”31, which would suggest that investor protection and systemic risk were not the main 
concerns of the host member state in this instance. 
In addition, a complete lack of understanding regarding the application of reverse solicitation, as can 
be found with the functioning of the passport, also haunts the NPPR system. 
Given this smorgasbord of unidentifiable additional requirements, it is important to consider how this 
assortment of schemes affects both the market and the investor.  Respondents to ESMA’s call for 
evidence report that the current “patchwork of rules”32 have resulted in the largest funds targeting the 
least onerous environments, which has resulted in the investors in the UK, Netherlands et al having 
access to a wider range of fund and investment choices than those based under the more stringent 
regimes.   Furthermore, this has led to increased concentration risk for those funds which have an 
unusually high level of exposure to those markets, and vice versa.  Not only have residents of Spain, 
France, Germany and Italy effectively been denied access to any third country alternative investments,  
smaller investment funds who are unable to navigate the confusion are denied access to European 
investors due to either an inability or unwillingness to pay for external legal counsel.  By allowing 
Member States to  gold-plate the NPPR regime, access to alternative investment funds across the 
                                                          
28 M Flint, M Cornish ‘The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive’ MJH Hedge Insight 
<http://mjhudson.com/emailers/hedge-insight-aifmd.htm> accessed 12 July 2016 
29 Note 15, Opinion, 193 
30 Note 15, Opinion, 219 
31 Note 15, Opinion, 219 
32 Note 15, Opinion, 211 
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European Union is anything but uniform, and may even result in lower returns for public investment 
funds, insurers and pension funds in those more onerous countries, increasing the cost to the citizens 
purse.33  
From an international perspective, it has been argued that the NPPR process hinders cross-border 
investment and is in contravention of Principle 6.2 of the G20 High-Level Principles of Long Term 
Investment Financing34, which seek to avoid unnecessary barriers to international investment.  
Moreover, one respondent argued that some NPPRs were also in violation of Article 63 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, which establishes that “all restrictions on the movement of 
capital between the Member States and third countries shall be prohibited”.35 This is hard to deny.  
Surveys carried out by the industry would appear to establish that this is indeed the case, with a 2014 
Prequin Report36 finding that 71% of US fund managers believe that the regulations will negatively affect 
the industry, with 40% stating that they would not seek to market in the EU.  Of the 12% stating that 
they were planning to use the private placement regimes, only 9% sought to establish a presence in 5 
or more Member States, and 37% stated that they would seek to market in the UK alone.  This is 
concerning, as the greater the choice of funds, the lower the level of concentration and systemic risk, 
so it appears that the AIFMD is inherently forcing the situation it was supposedly aiming to avoid.  
Another apposite point relates to the incomparability of Annex IV reporting, which, until standardised, is 
inoperable as a means of evaluating systemic risk across the EU.  
Despite these criticisms of the NPPRs, in the majority of cases they are still less onerous than the 
AIFMD as applied to EU AIFMs.  For this reason, many third country fund managers who have identified 
their investor base in one or two Member States are eager to utilise the regimes.  Although it was 
envisaged that access to the NPPRs would be cancelled in 2018 after a three year dual regime, the 
delay and confusion relating to the extension of the passport has resulted in calls for the NPPR process 
to remain open for those countries to whom the passport is not extended, and also, to be retained 
concurrently ad infinitum even for those countries granted admission to the passport to ensure market 
access for those smaller funds which only seek to market in one or two Member States.  The decision 
to assess de facto equivalence and extend the passport to a country or countries on a ‘tranche-basis’ 
has resulted in an NPPR regime which may be relied upon for longer than anticipated, and also, one 
that may be becoming more attractive as the issues and gold plating regarding the AIFMD proper 
become clear.  ESMA have issued no information relating to access to the NPPRs after 2018 should 
the third country not receive a passport by this time.  Furthermore, sub-threshold EUAIFs, which have 
chosen not to opt in to the full AIFMD regime and have exercised the exemption detailed in Article 3(2) 
                                                          
33 Note 15, Opinion, 277 
34G20 High Level Principles for Long Term Investment,  <http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/G20-
OECD-Principles-LTI-Financing.pdf>,  accessed 9 August 2016 
35 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2007] OJC326/47 
36 Prequin, ‘Global Hedge Fund Managers Respond to AIFMD’ July 2014, 
<https://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/Preqin-Special-Report-Hedge-Fund-Managers-Respond-to-AIFMD-
July-14.pdf> accessed 4 August 2016 
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of the Directive, are also unable to access the passport, and can only utilise the NPPRs when seeking 
to market within the Union.  Given the above, it is unsurprising that upon issuing this Opinion and Advice, 
ESMA requested more time. 
2.5 ESMA’s Initial Advice 
On the basis of the call for evidence upon which the above Opinion was based, ESMA issued its Advice 
on the extension of the passport to six third countries (Jersey, Guernsey, the U.S., Hong Kong, 
Switzerland and Singapore) concurrently in July of 2015.  It had been anticipated that this Advice would 
recommend that the passport be extended to those states deemed to have regimes which were in 
accordance with Article 67(4), specifically “Where ESMA considers that there are no significant 
obstacles regarding investor protection, market disruption, competition and the monitoring of systemic 
risk”.  In the Advice ESMA establishes a selection of criteria for each of these four areas against which 
the jurisdiction will be measured, these will be discussed in more detail where appropriate in the 
following section.  
In addition to the above criteria, the passport could not be extended to a jurisdiction unless it also 
complied with the requirements of Articles 35 (EUAIFM/Non EUAIF) and 37 (Non EUAIFM/Non EUAIF).  
These refer to i) the existence of a co-operation agreement between the third country and the home 
Member State or Member State of Reference, ii) whether the third country is listed as a non-co-operative 
country by the Financial Action Task Force and iii) whether a tax agreement has been signed by both 
the third country, home Member State or Member State of Reference and any countries within which 
the AIF is to be marketed. Each of these Article 35 and Article 37 stipulations have been met by both 
Jersey and Guernsey. 
2.6 Jersey 
The Jersey Financial Services Commission (JFSC) established the Alternative Investment Finds 
(Jersey) Regulations 2012 and these were issued and came into force in July 2013. The Regulations 
seek to provide an opt-in regime for Jersey based AIFMs/AIFs so that they could devise funds which 
were already compliant with the AIFMD with a view to the passport being extended to Jersey and those 
funds so authorised in July 2015.  It is interesting to note that the JFSC managed to devise and issue 
their regulations within the deadline set for the initial transposition of the AIFMD, a feat not achieved by 
several Member States. The Jersey regulations essentially mirror the European Directive, although they 
do differ in relation to the custody and remuneration disclosure requirements.  ESMA established that 
the relevant memoranda of understanding had been signed and deemed to be working effectively.  With 
regard to the depositary requirement, Jersey noted that for an extension of the passport, Jersey based 
funds and managers would need to abide by the depositary rules in addition to the Jersey Regulations, 
and with regard to remuneration, the JFSC had agreed to reconsider the reporting requirements in the 
light of the European Directive.  The depositary requirements in the AIFMD form a central tenet of the 
investor protection mechanisms, and accordingly are important when assessing third countries against 
the Article 67(4) criteria.  With regard to market disruption, ESMA asks whether “the granting of the 
passport to the non-EU AIFMs and AIFs unduly undermine the activity of the existing EU AIFMs due to 
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differences in the regulatory environment in the non-EU country and allow them to change their 
operating arrangements so as to circumnavigate the AIFMD?”.37This is an interesting question – 
essentially ESMA is trying to establish whether, if Jersey were to be granted the passport, EU AIFs and 
AIFMs would move operations to Jersey because the regime was less onerous and therefore funds and 
fund managers who should be applying the full AIFMD would be able to lever a market advantage by 
relocating their business in Jersey.  Jersey has applied a mirror regime, and has agreed that where the 
Jersey Regulations deviate from the AIFMD, the Directive’s rules on remuneration and depositaries 
shall apply.  This makes the question a moot point, and indeed, ESMA do not even publish a response 
to it, merely noting that an extension of the passport to Jersey would likely result in a wider range of 
funds being available to EU investors.   
However, in the preamble to the advice, ESMA repeatedly state that a positive recommendation should 
not be taken as an assessment of equivalence: in relation to investor protection, ESMA is quick to point 
out that it is the role of the Member State of Reference to establish whether the AIFMD rules are obeyed 
or not38, which makes one wonder why they are assessing the third country provisions at all.  
Furthermore, ESMA notes that “while it would not be appropriate to require … that there be a minimum 
degree of equivalence between the regulatory framework of the third country and the AIFMD, it is 
nevertheless relevant and necessary to investigate the extent to which the regulatory framework of the 
non-EU third country differs from the AIFMD”39.  This seems to be a circuitous argument, as on those 
occasions where the Jersey Regulations are not equivalent, ESMA has extracted a reassurance that 
the AIFMD rules will therefore apply, both with regard to depositaries and, if the Jersey Regulations are 
not changed, then with regard to remuneration disclosure also.   
With regard to obstacles to competition, Jersey extends the same access to market to third countries 
as it does to national AIF/Ms and therefore no reason to deny the passport can be found here. The final 
Article 67(4) matter for consideration is systemic risk which is to be assessed against whether there is 
“tangible evidence of adequate surveillance of market developments with a view to tracking systemic 
risk” and an assessment of how the regulatory regime complies with IOSCO Principle 640.  Given the 
importance of managing systemic risk to the origination of the AIFMD one could be forgiven for 
expecting a considerable discussion on the mechanisms and manners in which the third country 
acquired systemic risk indicators, standardised macro-prudential data and evidenced application of 
IOSCO principle 6. It is therefore surprising that the assessment of systemic risk management in Jersey 
is succinct “ESMA is of the view that Jersey has frameworks in place for addressing systemic risks.  
Reporting obligations in Jersey are similar to AIFMD reporting obligations.”41  This is an interesting 
assessment.  Principle 6 of the June 2010 ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’42 states 
                                                          
37 Note 14, Advice, 95(a) (Jersey)  
38 Note 14, Advice 17(1) 
39 Note 14, Advice 20 
40 Note 14, Advice 95 (a) (b) 
41 Note 14, Advice 98 
42 International Organisation of Securities Commissions, ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’, 
June 2010 
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that “The regulator should have or contribute to a process to monitor, mitigate and manage systemic 
risk, appropriate to its mandate.”  Jersey was most recently the subject of a Financial System Stability 
Assessment in September 200943. The Main Recommendations list as a High Priority that Jersey should 
“seek to develop mechanisms to receive early information on financial strains” and to “develop capacity 
to assess overall financial system soundness, including through stress testing.”44The report notes that 
the number of collective investment schemes and the assets under management have been increasing, 
with the sector aimed at alternative investments for institutional and high net worth individuals, yet the 
total assets under management of these are not stipulated45.  The report continues to recommend that 
Jersey “develop its capacity to assess overall financial sector stability”46 and notes that “there is no 
authority with an explicit mandate to maintain overall financial stability”47. Additionally, the report notes 
that funds regulation had been reformed to make the business more attractive, and that as at 2009, 
funds designed to attract institutional and larger private investors were considered by authorities “to be 
outside the scope of IOSCO principles relating to CISs.”48 Most interestingly, the Table detailing 
implementation of the IOSCO principles49 is based on the implementation of the 2003 IOSCO principles.  
The 2003 IOSCO principles50 do not include Principle 6 relating to the management of systemic risk, 
this Principle was a 2010 edition addition, and therefore not a marker against which Jersey has been 
measured.  
2.7 Guernsey 
The Guernsey Financial Services Commission have likewise introduced an opt-in regime for Guernsey 
AIFMs.  The AIFMD Rules 2013 and AIFMD (Marketing) Rules 2013 are mirror legislation and came 
into force in early 2013.  As in Jersey, the rules are slightly different in relation to the depositary; with 
regard to remuneration Guernsey has transposed Article 13 directly from the AIFMD and recognises 
that the depositary rules from the EU AIFMD would apply should a passport be granted.  The 2015 
ESMA Advice considers the application of the IOSCO Principles 10 -11 in relation to Investor Protection 
and states that Guernsey received “positive outcomes at that time.” (IMF – not published the Appendix)  
Again, ESMA found no threats to market disruption, nor obstacles to competition given that the 
regulations are a mirror regime and EU AIF/Ms are welcome to market under the same rules as 
Guernsey nationals.   With regard to the assessment of systemic risk provision, the ESMA Advice states 
“ESMA is of the view that Guernsey has frameworks in place for addressing systemic risks.  Reporting 
obligations in Jersey (sic) are similar to AIFMD reporting obligations”.  Perhaps this typographical 
mistake is demonstrative of the care taken by ESMA in assessing systemic risk management in 
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Guernsey.  The 2011 Guernsey Financial System Stability Assessment Update51recommends that 
Guernsey “establish a forum devoted to monitoring financial stability and coordinating policy 
responses”52 as a high priority, and later states that “there is scope for the GFSC to further develop its 
work on financial stability analysis”53.  The 2011 Guernsey FSAP confirms that the 2003 IOSCO 
principles have been ‘substantially implemented’, however, as with Jersey, Principle 6, as relating to 
systemic risk monitoring, was not a given principle at this time.   
In July 2015, ESMA’s advice in relation to Jersey and Guernsey was that there were “no significant 
obstacles regarding investor protection, competition, market disruption and the monitoring of systemic 
risk impeding the application of the AIFMD passport”54. However, this did not translate into a 
recommendation that the passport be extended to these jurisdictions.  ESMA suggested to the 
Commission that they wait until a “sufficient number” of non EU jurisdictions had received positive 
advice before the legislative procedures to extend the passport detailed in Articles 67(5) and (6) be 
triggered55.  The Commission agreed that a country by country approach was preferable, and agreed 
to decide when a sufficient number of countries had been positively assessed56. The Commission 
requested that a second set of Advice be produced by 30 June 2016, focussing on the countries already 
assessed and a further 6 countries not yet considered.  
2.8 ESMA – July 2016 Advice 
ESMA’s subsequent Advice57 was published in July 2016, and the explanation of the assessment 
criteria includes several interesting caveats.  With regard to the IOSCO principles 10-12, which relate 
to Investor Protection, ESMA determined that only FSAP reports dated later than 2013 were relevant 
to these criteria.  Should the latest FSAP have taken place prior to 2013, as is the case for both 
Guernsey and Jersey, then follow up questions should be sent and effectively these criteria would be 
self-assessed.  ESMA continues to explain the limitations of such self-assessment, confirming that 
these are effectively sub-standard to an FSAP review as they “could not include extensive research, 
on-site interviews and/or visits to cross check information”58.  In accordance with the above, both Jersey 
and Guernsey received the follow-up questionnaire in relation to the application of IOSCO Principles 
10-12, which relate to regulatory powers of securities regulators.  Both the JFSC and GFSC completed 
the self-assessment and answered all questions positively, however, ESMA do reiterate that this 
assessment of investor protection is subject to desk-based limitations.  Despite the fact that FSAPs that 
have taken place in 2009 rely on the 2003 IOSCO principle, thereby not assessing provision for 
managing systemic risk (Principle 6), there is no mention of this in the 2016 ESMA Advice under the 
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‘Monitoring of Systemic Risk’ criteria, and once again, the Advice in relation to the extension of the 
passport to both Guernsey and Jersey is unchanged, however, whilst there are still no significant 
obstacles, there is still no clear suggestion as to when the passport may be extended.  
2.9 Isle of Man 
The Isle of Man was assessed for the first time in the 2016 Advice and, unlike the other crown 
dependencies, has not taken the opportunity to adopt opt-in mirror AIFMD legislation.  Whilst the 
necessary memoranda of understanding have been established, the other requirements are distinctly 
lacking.  Depositary requirements only exist in the Isle of Man for funds available to retail investors and 
remuneration requirements are principle rather than risk based. In addition, the Isle of Man has not 
been subject to an FSAP IMF report, even prior to 2013, and accordingly only self-assessment against 
IOSCO principles 10-12 has been performed, again with the paragraph 23 caveat from ESMA that this 
information has not been validated.  There is little concern with regard to market disruption, but with 
regard to competition, any retail fund wishing to market within the Isle of Man must obtain recognition 
from the Isle of Man Financial Services Authority (“IOMFSA”).  At present, those funds from ‘designated 
territories’ are able to achieve recognition; however, the IOMFSA has indicated that it would be happy 
to extend designated territory status to the EEA area59.  Although the Isle of Man has a small 
economically active population, only 44,609 in 201160, it is becoming clear in the assessment criteria of 
the 2016 Advice that the Obstacles to Competition criteria are increasingly being interpreted as a means 
of ensuring reciprocal market access before extension of the passport.   
3. MiFID II 
3.1 MiFID I 
The first Markets in Financial Instruments Directive was introduced in 2004 (MiFID I) and came into 
force in 2007.  MiFID I was based on the 1993 Investment Services Directive and sought to ease the 
cross border provision of investment services and investment firm regulation.  Accordingly, the Directive 
was applicable to “investment banks, portfolio managers, stockbrokers and broker dealers, corporate 
finance firms many futures and options firms and some commodities firms.”61  The directive was recast 
following the financial crisis and replaced with both a Directive62 (MiFID) and a Regulation63 (MiFiR) 
(together, “MiFID II”) in 2014 following a lengthy consultation process which began in 2010. Given the 
complexity of the legislation it is now due to come into force in 2018. Under MiFID I, access to European 
markets by third country investment firms was managed by the Member States, and whilst the aim of 
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MiFID I was to ease the provision of cross border services within the EU, the extension of a 
harmonisation regime to third country providers was not included.  Each EU Member State decides its 
own rules on access to the market for third countries and, providing that preferential treatment is not 
given to a third country over an EU firm, the Member State was free to make its own rules.  In the UK, 
access for third country firms is currently available via the Overseas Persons Exemption detailed in 
Article 72 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, which excludes 
a third country firm from requiring authorisation under the s19 of the FSMA.   
3.2 Third Country Firms and Passporting under MiFID II 
MiFiD II has changed the access requirements for third country firms, however, the final rules have 
been the subject of considerable debate and consternation.  As with MiFID I, access to clients in the 
EU is based upon classification of investor.  Under MiFID II there are four classifications of investor; 
retail, elective professional, per se professional and eligible counterparty.  Access to per se professional 
clients and eligible counterparties will be available on a passported basis across the EU to third country 
firms, via one of two regimes.  Access to retail and elective professional clients is not possible on a 
cross-border EU passport basis. 
The first means of passporting to eligible counterparties and per se professional clients is detailed in 
Article 46 of MiFIR64.  This route requires the third country firm to register with ESMA, that the third 
country jurisdiction has been assessed as ‘equivalent’, that the firm is authorised in its home member 
state to provide those services and that co-operation agreements are in place between ESMA and the 
third country.  Access to retail clients is governed by Article 39 of MiFIR.  Third countries are given the 
option to establish a branch regime, or not.  Should a Member State choose not to opt in to the branch 
regime, then Member State rules will apply; however, should the Member State choose to introduce the 
branch regime, then the rules as detailed in the Regulation will apply.  The UK has already established 
that it does not wish to implement the branch regime, which will enable third country firms to access 
retail clients in the UK without having been assessed for equivalence and without establishing a branch.  
However, if a third country firm has already established a branch in accordance with Article 39, then 
this branch can be used to passport services to professional clients and eligible counterparties across 
the Union, if the third country has been assessed as equivalent. 
3.3 Article 47 and the assessment of equivalence 
Equivalence will be assessed in accordance with Article 47 of MiFIR.  A decision of equivalence will be 
determined by whether “the legal and supervisory arrangements in the third country ensure that firms 
authorised in that country comply with legally binding prudential and business conduct requirements 
which have equivalent effect to the requirements of [MiFID II].” 65 The prudential and business conduct 
framework will be assessed against ongoing supervision requirements, own capital requirements, 
“appropriate requirements applicable to shareholders and their management body”66, internal controls, 
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conduct of business and the prevention of insider dealing.  Most interesting is the requirement that the 
third country framework must provide for an equivalent regime for recognising EU investment firms, a 
de facto reciprocity agreement.  It is also interesting to note that there is no mention of systemic risk in 
the equivalence decision as detailed in Article 47, however, in Recital 44 of the Regulation it states that 
the equivalence decision will be based on the G20 principles, and the management and mitigation of 
systemic risk is stipulated.  
3.4 MiFID II – Jersey Consultation 
The JFSC issued a consultation paper in April 201667 relating to whether or not Jersey should attempt 
to gain a positive decision of MiFID II equivalence.  Whilst the AIFMD enabled the crown dependencies 
to choose whether to introduce an opt-in regime which could run concurrently with their existing fund 
regulation structure, the level of regulation imposed by MiFID II would result in considerable changes 
to the Jersey Codes of Practice.  Such is the level of complexity that the Jersey regulator had already 
determined that either a comprehensive reorganisation of the regulatory space was required or 
alternatively equivalence not be sought: “The consultation paper proposes that a Jersey MiFID II 
equivalent regime would apply to all clients, irrespective of EU residency.  The rationale behind this is 
reduced complexity for both the industry and the Commission from operating one regulatory regime, 
equal treatment of clients, and because, based on feedback received to date, it appears to be industry’s 
favoured option.  In addition, the Commission understands that the European Commission may demand 
it as a condition of equivalence.”68 This is an interesting aside which will be considered in due course. 
The JFSC note that there are three main unknowns relating to the MiFID II third country regimen.  With 
regard to the MiFID harmonised branch, it is still unclear which Member States are likely to insist on the 
establishment of a branch to access retail clients and professional clients.  It is probable that the more 
closed economies of the EU, those which had extremely onerous NPPR regimes under AIFMD, are 
also likely to require third country firms to establish a branch under the Article 39 rules; the more open 
economies, such as Luxembourg and Belgium, who did not gold plate the NPPR rules are also less 
likely to invoke the Article 39 branch regime. Secondly, the importance of being deemed equivalent, 
and an understanding of how that is likely to work in practice, and finally the transitional provision which 
enables a country to use national regimes for three years after an equivalence decision has been given.   
In order to be deemed equivalent, Jersey would need to extend its list of regulated activities, and update 
its corporate governance requirements.  MiFID II incorporates the corporate governance requirement 
in the Capital Requirements Directive, and determines that individuals can be personally liable for fines 
and limits the number of directorships that individuals can hold, with a split between the Chairman and 
CEO.  Many investment businesses in the Channel Islands are managed by a very small board, with 
the majority of administrative and portfolio management functions being delegated to professional 
services providers.  Limiting the number of Directorships and requiring the inclusion of various 
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governance committees at the Board level would mark a dramatic shift for the investment management 
business on the island, with Directors actually resident often necessary for tax purposes.  Those that 
are actually categorised as Jersey resident are in short supply and high demand and therefore, the 
imposition of these corporate governance requirements could result in a shortage of skills at the 
requisite level.  The inclusion of the capital adequacy requirements from CRD IV extends the need for 
an ‘own funds’ capital requirement to third country investment firms.  At present, the JFSC appear to 
have little understanding of the implications on this for home state firms in relation to their existing ANLA 
ratio, which is currently used to measure both capital adequacy and liquidity in Jersey.  It is unlikely that 
this will prove satisfactory as a calculation, however, as the consultation paper states, there is a chance 
that the capital adequacy requirements will be simplified at the behest of the European Banking 
Authority for non-systemically important institutions.69  Investor protection forms a central tenet of MiFID 
II, and the JFSC note in the consultation paper that at present there is no active Investor Compensation 
Scheme in Jersey, and that the introduction of one would result in a levy being placed on the industry 
of between 0.2 and 0.4%, furthermore, the Commission identifies a considerable number of conduct 
requirements and internal controls which would further place a financial burden on the investment 
business.  In addition, the costs to the JFSC are not small, given the redrafting of regulation, increased 
monitoring of firms and products and the increased regulatory scope. 
3.5 Guernsey 
Unlike Jersey, the GFSC has not consulted with the industry in relation to whether MiFID II equivalence 
should be sought.  Similarly to Jersey, one can assume that the adoption of a MiFID II regime would 
result in comprehensive changes to the current regime, given the resources that would be required to 
manage two regulatory regimes concurrently.  As at August 2014 the GFSC appeared to assume that 
MiFID II equivalence was an extension of assessment under the AIFMD and sought to “educate those 
[ESMA] officials in respect of the regulated financial services sectors in the Bailiwick”70; however, it is 
probable that they have underestimated the extent to which seeking MiFID II equivalence would result 
in fundamental changes to the regulatory regime in Guernsey. 
3.6 Criticisms of the MiFID II Third Country Regime 
MiFID II initially required all Member States to require that a branch be established by any third country 
firm wishing to access the retail markets.  This was the subject of much debate, and contested by the 
House of Lords, who considered the third country requirements, both the establishment of a branch and 
the assessment of equivalence and reciprocity as “deeply flawed”71.  Whilst concerns regarding access 
to retail clients were eventually reflected in the final Directive, with the branch opt-in clause, the 
Committee was also deeply concerned about the assessment of equivalence and reciprocity, noting 
that “it was unlikely that many third country jurisdictions” would meet the tests.  It was apparent to the 
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Committee that the third country rules would result in an effective barrier being placed around both 
European markets and investors, which would be incredibly damaging to the City of London and 
likewise, not in the best interests of European investors.  As one adviser to the Committee stated 
“Effectively, we would be saying to the rest of the world, ‘Don’t call us, we’ll call you.’”72Professor 
Avgouleas agreed, noting that the equivalence and reciprocity requirements effectively created a 
‘Fortress Europe’ situation, and conceding that whilst protection for retail investors was a worthy aim, it 
was a “different thing from shutting down the borders of European Markets to third country providers.”73  
In the same report, it was noted that the likelihood of assessing 100 jurisdictions against the 
considerable requirements of Article 47 and Recital 44, including systemic risk and the G20 principles, 
within a four year timeframe was “unrealistic”74.  
The assessment of equivalence and reciprocity will be carried out by ESMA, and given the amount of 
time that it has taken to assess six countries for de facto equivalence with the AIFMD regime, which is 
a simpler piece of legislation, unrealistic could be considered an understatement.  Effectively, the 
Commission needs to decide whether equivalence will be judged against regulatory outcomes, i.e. a 
principles based regime, or whether complete adherence with MiFID II is sought.  This argument 
touches on the extent to which large trading blocks, such as the US or the EU, can expect to apply their 
legislation extraterritorially, and what happens when these continental powers have differing or even 
opposite regulatory approaches? The US essentially addressed the G20 principles with the Dodd-Frank 
Act, and if abidance with Dodd-Frank were to equate with MiFID II, and the US were to allow access to 
their market to MiFID II compliant firms, then perhaps the statement from Steven Maijoor “that the 
easiest and most efficient option is relying on mutual recognition”75could be relied upon and interpreted 
as a move from ESMA toward an assessment based upon regulatory objectives rather than a rules 
based approach. Swinburne confirms that “strict equivalence and reciprocity would effectively close 
down the EU financial markets”76 and it cannot be denied that “we will never be effective if a single 
regulator seeks to regulate the entire global financial markets from one single location”77.  
It is important to note that at present, and until the Directive has been transposed into statute across 
the Union, the desire by third countries to be deemed equivalent is an unknown quantity.  If a 
considerable number of large countries choose not to impose the Article 37 branch regime, then both 
professional and retail investors will be available to third country firms without either establishing a 
branch or the third country being deemed as equivalent.  However, as is likely, the adoption of the 
branch regime by some of the largest economies in the Union may drive a desire to achieve equivalence 
thus accessing a cross border passport for professional investors and access to retail clients. 
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4 The Rise of Equivalence – The European Regulatory Environment post the 2007 Financial 
Crisis. 
4.1 Alternative Investment Funds and Systemic Risk 
The AIFMD and MiFID II were introduced following the crisis, ostensibly in response to the crisis, 
however, the extent to which alternative investment funds caused or even exacerbated the crisis is a 
matter for debate.  This section will consider the nature of both private equity funds and hedge funds 
and how they contribute to systemic risk. 
Private equity funds are typically arranged as limited partnerships, with each investor being a limited 
partner and the fund manager acting as general partner.  Private equity funds are closed end funds, 
meaning that the equity is invested for a set time period with no redemptions until that time, up to ten 
years, and once the fund has closed additional investors/limited partners cannot partake.  The fund 
then invests in private companies and seeks to increase the value of those companies over time.  
Private equity funds do utilise leverage, but this is typically done at investee company level.  Due to the 
length of time over which a private equity fund seeks to make a return, and the means of so doing, 
private equity funds are typically illiquid.  Returns are generally created by selling or floating investee 
companies after a three to five year time frame.  The capital structure of a private equity fund prior to 
the financial crisis was typically 30% equity (provided by investors), 10% loan notes (quasi-equity) and 
30% debt, which may be arranged over a number of levels78.  This debt was typically provided by banks. 
Private equity funds aim to make a return through managing the company in such a way as to service 
the debt and increase the value of the company and provide a return to investors.  
Hedge funds are structured similarly, as a limited partnership with the fund manager acting as general 
partner.  However, hedge funds are not limited to the investment mandate that private equity funds are, 
and may use a variety of means to secure the highest returns possible.  For this reason, hedge fund 
managers usually have a broad investment mandate that does not stipulate available asset classes, or 
investment limits within certain geographic areas or instruments.  For the most part, hedge fund 
managers are free to utilise the fund in any way they see fit to create higher than average returns.  As 
hedge fund managers are paid a set fee, plus a proportion of the increase in the value of the fund, this 
can encourage risk taking.  Whilst private equity funds are typically illiquid, hedge funds are highly liquid, 
and trading by hedge funds contributes considerably to daily trade volumes. McDonald reports that 
whilst hedge funds comprise an estimated 5% of assets under management, they also contribute an 
estimated 40-50% of daily trading volumes79. Hedge funds utilise investment strategies such as short 
selling and trading in derivatives. Whilst private equity funds create leverage in the market at investee 
company level, hedge funds use leverage at the fund level as a matter of course, indeed, “the 
relationship between hedge funds and systemic risk is bound up in hedge funds defining characteristic: 
to pursue aggressive investment strategies to make immediate returns whilst maintaining significant 
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levels of leverage vis-a-vis other market participants.80”  Hedge funds create systemic risk via one of 
two ways, market risk and credit risk.  Credit risk supposes that the highly leveraged fund may not be 
able to repay its counterparty when its debts fall due; this may be created through a liquidity and maturity 
mismatch, whereby sufficient liquid funds are not available at the time of either a redemption request or 
the need to secure further debt at maturity of a loan.  When that counterparty is a large investment 
bank, which may also have a retail division, and the collateral posted is not sufficient to cover the debt, 
it is possible that systemic risk could spread into the retail banking sector.  Secondly, market risk 
supposes that should credit become harder to secure, one or more hedge funds may seek to dispose 
of their assets, which may be the same asset or same asset class, at the same time, thus flooding the 
market and driving down prices. This in turn can cause a downwards trend in the market due to the vast 
volumes of assets that hedge funds can trade.  As McDonald81 points out, in a highly leveraged 
environment where credit is cheap, the collateral placed against debt may not be worth an equivalent 
amount and accordingly, whilst a high leverage ratio will amplify gains, it will also amplify losses.  
As private equity funds take on leverage at the investee company, the fund itself does not contribute to 
systemic risk in this fashion.  As Payne points out, highly leveraged portfolio companies could indeed 
fail, and in so doing create counterparty risk, however, this should not have a knock on effect to other 
portfolio companies as they are not cross-collateralised82. Furthermore, should an external event 
encourage the swift sale of private equity assets on the markets, this is unlikely to create an equivalent 
effect due to the closed ended, long term, highly illiquid nature of private equity investments.  In short, 
there is little to suggest that private equity funds contributed to the financial crisis of 2007/8, and the 
European Central Bank agreed, stating “the likelihood of LBO [leveraged buyout] activity posing 
systemic risks for the banking sector appears remote at the EU level.83” 
Prior to the financial crisis, the risks to the market posed by hedge funds were largely assumed to be 
contained through market discipline.  McDonald explains this clearly.  Should the level of collateral 
provided fall against the level of credit extended, the extent to which this causes liquidity and credit risk 
is determined by the risk management policies of the counterparties themselves.  McDonald points out 
that in order to mitigate these risks, the counterparties need to have sturdy internal control procedures, 
but they also need to have access to information regarding the fund’s risk profile.  Accordingly, when a 
hedge fund is financed via a large number of counterparties, there is a risk that they each rely on the 
due diligence of others “which may render resultant collective discipline inadequate”84.  Despite this, 
there is a general consensus that the recent financial crisis was not caused by the private equity and 
hedge fund industries.  De Larosiere states that “they did not play a major part in the emergence of the 
crisis”85 however, he went on to confirm “there is a need for greater transparency since banks, the main 
lenders to hedge funds, and their supervisors have not been able to obtain a global view of the risks 
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they were engaging in.”86  De Larosiere’s report marks a sea change in the approach to EU regulation 
of the parallel banking system, which Quaglia87 argues is political in its foundations.   
4.2 The politics of post-crisis Financial Services Regulation in the EU 
Quaglia frames the European Union’s regulatory stance as a tale of two coalitions, one being the Anglo-
American coalition, and the second being the Franco-Germanic coalition.  Because of the unique nature 
of the European Union, EU legislation is by its nature a result of the competing wishes of the Member 
States.  Quaglia terms the Anglo-American coalition as ‘market-making’ and the Franco-Germanic 
coalition as ‘market-shaping’. Market-making is defined as a regulatory outlook which favours the 
market, and emphasises the objectives of competition and market efficiency, whereas market–shaping 
is defined as a regulatory outlook with a focus on financial stability and consumer protection.  A market-
making regulatory environment would demonstrate a minimum of regulation, and a belief and reliance 
on market discipline, “light touch, principles based regulation and private sector governance88”.  
Conversely, “the market-shaping approach favoured prescriptive, rule-based regulation, with a strong 
steering action by public authorities.”89  Quaglia argues that the single market is by its very nature a 
product of a market-making regulatory approach, which favours equal access for market players to a 
large number of consumers, and this was intensified by the introduction of a single currency.  For these 
reasons, it is argued that the market-making paradigm was the dominant force behind EU financial 
regulation in the years following the creation of the single market up to the financial crisis of 2007/8.  
Whilst this argument is an interesting construct through which to consider post crisis EU regulation, it 
should be noted that all hedge funds were required to be registered with the FSA prior to 2007. 
The failure of the financial system in 2007 was seen as a failure of the market-making regulatory 
approach, and accordingly, the regulatory response can be viewed as a move towards a regulatory 
model dominated by the market–shaping paradigm.  Ferran90 argues that alternative investments funds 
were not unregulated in the EU, just not regulated at the EU level, and were subject to a variety of 
Member States’ rules.  Despite an awareness of the growth of the industry, Ferran argues that 
Commissioner McCreevy was an advocate of the market-making paradigm, and accordingly, although 
regulation of the sector was considered, it was with a view to promoting, rather than curtailing the 
industry.  However, support for the regulation of hedge funds at a Union level was growing, with the 
strongest advocates being both the European Parliament, and, at a Member State level, France and 
Germany, with France calling for a tax on speculative capital movements in 2007 whilst Germany’s call 
for codes of conduct and transparency standards at the 2007 G8 failed following opposition from the 
US and the UK91.  However, as the crisis deepened, a sea change in political will was apparent, and at 
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the 2009 G20 a commitment was given “to ensure that all financial markets, products and participants 
were subject to appropriate regulation…including hedge funds, that may present a systemic risk.”92 
The AIFMD marks a triumph for the market-shaping coalition, and a move towards dominance in the 
EU of the Franco-Germanic coalition, ostensibly under the guise of breaking down the opacity of the 
parallel banking system and enabling regulators to confidently assess the levels of systemic risk in the 
system, including that created by excessive use of leverage in the private equity and hedge fund 
markets.  However, commentators have argued that post crisis EU financial policy has political aims 
that are more complicated than the management of systemic risk.  By its nature, systemic risk cannot 
be contained by borders, and this is the rationale for the application of ‘equivalence’ to third countries 
seeking to do business in the European Union.  However, several commentators and industry 
professionals see ‘equivalence’ not just as a means of containing and measuring systemic risk, but 
rather an opportunity for the EU to exert control over both access to its markets, access to other markets 
and global financial policy. 
4.3 The Rise of Equivalence 
Pagliari93 agrees with Quaglia’s market-making v market-shaping power shift in the EU after 2007.  
Pagliari argues that prior to 2007 equivalence was not a feature of European Union financial regulation, 
partially due to the willingness of the EU to recognise US regulation.  This was not a willingness that 
was reciprocated, and the US “continued to require European firms seeking to access the US markets 
to comply with US regulations”94.  However, following the perceived failure of the system, ostensibly 
based on the market-making paradigm, the EU was no longer so favourable towards allowing home 
state regulation over activities within its borders.  Pagliari argues that the financial collapse did not 
originate in the EU, and the failure of US institutions to effectively supervise their European activities 
increased the desire within the new political power structures in the EU to restrict market access to third 
country players, on the basis of the fact that they were likely to import systemic risk.  Accordingly, the 
situation arose whereby in the post crisis era, the EU had not only increased its regulatory capacity by 
moving away internally from the Anglo-American coalition, but in so doing the drivers of regulation were 
more interested in promoting financial stability rather than a competitive market environment.  Pagliari 
argues this explains the equivalence requirements in post crisis EU financial regulation, and 
demonstrates a distinct move away from the authority sharing arrangements of the pre-crisis, market-
driven, period.  Unsurprisingly, both third country regulators and EU market players are disappointed 
by what is interpreted as an increasingly protectionist regime.  One hedge fund manager describes the 
AIFMD as “a politically driven effort to place obstacles in the way of an industry that is almost exclusively 
based in the US and UK95”, and Pagliari quotes US Senator Schumer, who refers to the insistence that 
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European trades in over the counter derivatives be cleared in the EU as a “protectionist policy” and a 
“power grab”96. 
Quaglia97 argues that ‘equivalence’ has become a “cornerstone” of post 2009 EU regulation, noting that 
up until this point, the EU held a multilateralist, rather than unilateralist stance (citing Posner and Veron).  
However, the origination of the financial crisis in the US due to the lackadaisical regulation of the sub-
prime mortgage market marked a move away from reliance on third party regulators and a move 
towards closer regulation of all market actors, whether they originated in the EU or not.  Quaglia posits 
three possible reasons for the rise of equivalence post 2009.  Primarily, equivalence could simply be a 
means of preventing the importing of financial risk from less well-regulated jurisdictions, the argument 
given by the European Commission.  Secondly, Quaglia follows Pagliari’s argument and suggests that 
the imposition of equivalence clauses is an attempt to flex regulatory muscle extraterritorially. Finally 
Quaglia suggests that equivalence is driven by protectionism, with European market-shapers utilising 
their newly discovered regulatory clout to limit access to European markets.  Quaglia argues that in 
fact, equivalence and the terms it has been couched within, has been carefully designed to “appease 
both the market-makers and the market-shapers”98, whilst maintaining an objective of both stability and 
competitiveness. 
Quaglia argues that for the market-makers, equivalence is an enabler, a means of maintaining 
international competitiveness, whereas for market-shapers, it is a provider of stability by ensuring that 
EU standards are maintained by third party providers.  What remains to be seen is how the meaning of 
equivalence is applied.  Equivalence and identikit are two different words with very different meanings.  
Equivalence has largely been passed to ESMA to assess, and whether equivalence will be interpreted 
as ‘equal in value to’, or whether equivalence will be assessed as ‘identical’ will have far reaching 
implications.  If the true meaning of equivalence is applied, then those countries that are well regulated, 
but that have different rules may well find they have access to the European markets.  However, should 
the converse be true, and equivalence is interpreted to mean ‘having the same rules’, then access to 
the European markets may well be restricted and equivalence could be interpreted as a policy of 
protectionism.  Is equivalence a matter to be judged on a principles-based approach, typically the 
regulatory space preferred by the Anglo-American coalition, or is equivalence to be assessed from a 
rules-based approach, typically the regulatory space adopted by the Franco-German coalition? 
The next section will return to the July 2016 Advice issued by ESMA in relation to the extension of the 
third country passport, and discuss on the basis of this Advice whether the assessment of equivalence 
appears to be principle or rule-based. 
4.4 Equivalence – Rules-Based or Principles-Based? 
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In July 2015, the U.S. was one of the first countries to be assessed by ESMA, who reached the 
conclusion that at present, they did not have enough information about the American system to assess 
whether the passport should be extended.  The 2016 Advice is more comprehensive.  When being 
assessed against the criteria of investor protection, market disruption, obstacles to competition and 
systemic risk, it becomes apparent that for certain of these criteria, a rules-based approach is being 
applied, and for other criteria, a principles-based approach is being applied.   With regard to investor 
protection, the US does not have rules which are equivalent to the EU regarding either depositaries or 
remuneration.  However, as has been noted above, in paragraph 19 of the Advice, ESMA state that the 
third country, should a passport be extended, will still be required to comply with both the depositary 
and remuneration requirements as established in the AIFMD, so with regard to investor protection, the 
rules of the AIFMD will extend extraterritorially.  With regard to systemic risk, ESMA note that “reporting 
obligations for US managers are extensive, but differ[s] from the requirements in the AIFMD to some 
extent.”99  Regardless, the Advice still states that “ESMA is of the view that there are no significant 
obstacles regarding the monitoring of systemic risk impeding the application of the AIFMD passport to 
the US”100.  Accordingly, one can assume that this is demonstrative of a principle-based approach to 
the assessment of equivalence in relation to systemic risk.  Interestingly, the section relating to 
‘obstacles to competition’ is by far the most detailed.   ESMA note that in order for a foreign fund to 
market in the US it can either establish a subsidiary which is subject to US regulation, or it has to be 
judged as “practically feasible” to enforce the 1940 Act, thereby ensuring that US based investors have 
the same level of protection as when investing in a US fund. In practice, this is rarely the path chosen 
to access the market as it results in a foreign fund having to abide with two sets of regulation, and 
accordingly usually a sub fund is established, or a reverse solicitation process is utilised.  ESMA 
concluded that, should a third country passport be extended to the US, a level playing field between the 
two jurisdictions would not exist; access to EU markets for US funds would be extended without the 
same access being permitted in the other direction, however, this only relates to funds which were likely 
to be offered publically, ESMA admits that access to private markets would remain comparable.  In its 
final Advice on the matter, ESMA therefore recommends that the passport only be extended to US 
based funds with one of three caveats; that either the passport is only extended to professional investors 
that will be privately placed, or a strict restriction to professional investors only.  Effectively, ESMA is 
recommending an extension of a ‘private equity only’ passport in direct response to the market access 
granted to EU funds in the US. 
When looking to the assessment of Australia in the same document, the investor protection elements 
of the AIFMD (depositaries and remuneration requirements) are also to be interpreted as rules-based 
equivalence to be regulated by the Member State of Reference, and effectively need not form part of 
the assessment.  However, once again, the ‘obstacles to competition’ section is extensive, and notes a 
‘class order relief’ which is currently only available to German and UK funds.  The Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission has “indicated that they are willing to discuss extending this to EU 
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AIFMs…on a more reciprocal basis”101 and accordingly, on the basis of this, ESMA is once again of the 
view that there are “no significant obstacles” to the extension of the passport to Australia.   
With regard to the Advice in relation to Hong Kong, it is interesting to note that the Hong Kong Securities 
and Futures Commission has its own equivalence regime, whereby jurisdictions can be classified as 
‘acceptable inspection regimes’ (“AIR”) and furthermore, does not restrict access to AIFs who only 
market to professional investors.   The AIR regime only applies to retail investors, and as such would 
be outside the remit of AIF equivalence, but would only apply to UCITS regimes.  At present, five EU 
Member States are deemed as AIR, which means that access to the Hong Kong retail market is not 
currently on a par across all Member States.  ESMA has no concerns about extension of the passport, 
“if ESMA considers the above assessment only in relation to AIFs”102, however, ESMA does take into 
consideration the AIR regime in its concluding Advice, and notes that the rules applying to UCITS funds 
based in different EU states are not the same.  It is an interesting development that the extension of the 
AIFMD passport should take into consideration access to the retail markets, and is perhaps 
demonstrative of the manner in which the third country passport may be utilised by the market shaping 
coalition. 
To reconsider the assessment of Jersey and Guernsey discussed earlier, it is to be remembered that 
both the crown dependencies were swiftly issued with positive advice relating to the extension of the 
passport, despite less than convincing assessment of the control measures in relation to the 
management and measurement of systemic risk.  Both jurisdictions also allow unbridled access to their 
markets for EU players.   
4.5 Analysis of July 2016 Equivalence Assessment   
Having reconsidered the application of the equivalence criteria in the light of Quaglia and Pagliari’s 
research it is possible to draw several conclusions.  Primarily, equivalence is evidently assessed against 
both principle and rule-based criteria.  With regard to investor protection, the Directive insists that the 
depositary and remuneration rules will apply to all funds equally, and equivalence can be seen as an 
extension of EU legislation extraterritorially.  With regard to systemic risk, it appears that a principle 
based approach has been determined, with a positive response to the US regime despite its differences.   
Jersey and Guernsey were demonstrably lacking in the area of systemic risk management and macro-
prudential supervision, yet the extension of the passport to the Channel Islands was recommended.  
What becomes apparent is that market access and reciprocity is a major consideration when 
determining equivalence.  Quaglia posited three possible reasons for the inclusion of equivalence 
provisions in the post crisis era, the prevention of imported financial instability, the exertion of 
extraterritorial power and creation of a protected EU market.  Based on the analysis of the 2016 Advice, 
the least important of these criteria to ESMA is the prevention of imported financial instability, the 
exertion of extraterritorial power certainly forms a part of the equivalence criteria, as can be seen with 
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regard to elements relating to investor protection.  The additional NPPR requirements in place in some 
states are indeed evidence of a protectionist regulatory stance, with a preference for EU based 
managers and funds over those that originate from third countries.  Moreover, there is little evidence 
that equivalence assessment directly links to protectionist policy, and one can conclude that 
protectionism is more applicable as a concern at Member State rather than Union level.  More evidence 
is available to suggest that reciprocal market access is a greater concern to the Union, and that the 
changing political environment after the breakdown of the Anglo-American market making paradigm 
has been utilised by European policy makers to ensure that the hegemony of US regulation as a global 
standard is now being brought into question. 
5. Conclusion 
To conclude, following the financial crisis of 2007/2008 there was a global move to introduce greater 
regulation of the parallel banking system, having been agreed at the G20 that the opacity and size of 
both the private equity and hedge funds industries, in conjunction with over the counter trading of 
derivatives, had resulted in an inability to accurately assess global systemic risk.  At the EU level, this 
resulted in the introduction of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive and the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation, which extend the remit of EU financial regulation to 
third countries. Whilst the AIFMD allows for temporary access to the EU markets via Member State’s 
NPPRs, it was envisaged that a third country passport would be made available to third country firms 
from July 2015.  ESMA published an Opinion on the functioning of the passport for EU Member States 
and the NPPRs at this time and determined that there were considerable differences between the 
application of the Directive across Member States, with variations in pricing, barriers to access, and 
NPPR regimes which mirrored the AIF regime in its entirety.  Having considered the functioning of the 
existing regime, ESMA considered the extension of the third country passport to third countries on a 
case by case basis, effectively creating a de facto assessment of equivalence. In July 2015 ESMA 
issued Advice which, whilst positive in regard to the extension of the passport to Jersey and Guernsey, 
did not recommend that the third country passport mechanism be activated by the Commission at this 
time.  When considering the extension of the passport to third countries, ESMA took into consideration 
the standards of investor protection, market disruption, competition and the monitoring of systemic risk.  
As has been demonstrated, equivalence has been assessed against both rules and principles.  With 
regard to investor protection, the AIFMD regulations on depositaries and remuneration policies are to 
be abided by in full to achieve a positive recommendation of equivalence, whereas assessment of 
systemic risk is more likely to be assessed in principle. As has been shown, systemic risk provision in 
Jersey and Guernsey has been deemed satisfactory by ESMA despite shortcomings in their process 
which cannot be overlooked. 
Prior to the crisis, EU financial regulation relating to third country access was established at Member 
State level, and the EU approach to regulation was typically dominated by the Anglo-American coalition, 
which favoured market-discipline as opposed to rule-based regulation.  Following the crisis, the 
perceived failure of the Anglo-American model resulted in a global sea change in relation to regulation 
of financial services.  The failure of the UK-centric model predicated the resultant rise of the Franco-
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Germanic coalition in the EU, whilst additionally the EU’s regulatory capacity increased following the 
failure of the US-centric model and the increasing size of the EU as a trading block.  Quaglia argues 
that this marks a move from market-making regulatory dominance to market-shaping regulatory 
dominance.  Quaglia argues that the rise of equivalence is a means of balancing the needs of the 
market–shapers and the market-makers within the Union, with the UK based coalition preferring a loose, 
principles based assessment of third country regimes, and with the Franco-German alliance seeking a 
more prescriptive rules based assessment. 
Pagliari argues that prior to the crisis, transatlantic financial regulation was typified by a slanted playing 
field, with US players having access to EU markets with home supervision, whilst EU players wishing 
to access US markets had to abide by US regulations.  Following the move towards a more stringent 
regulatory environment, the EU has capitalised on its revived regulatory capacity and Quaglia gives 
three possible reasons for the increase in equivalence provisions; to prevent imported financial stability, 
to exert extraterritorial regulatory power, or protectionist intent.  Having considered the evidence, it is 
apparent that reciprocal market access has become an additional, if not dominant, driver behind 
ESMA’s assessments in relation to the AIFMD third country passport, and that the prevention of 
systemic risk is not a major concern.   
ESMA has likewise been tasked with the assessment of equivalence of third countries in relation to 
MiFID II.  As yet there is no evidence available in order to assess whether this will take a rules-based 
or principles-based approach, however, it is probable that reciprocity and equal access to markets will 
be required before any passport is extended.  The third country passport can be considered a tool which 
the newly invigorated market-shaping ruling EU coalition can, and will, wield to ensure that EU market 
participants are not disadvantaged on the world stage. 
The question of regulating global markets by regional governments is fraught with difficulties.  It is likely 
that, despite the post-crisis fragmentation of transatlantic regulation, a more permanent solution will be 
sought.  Ng103 discusses “equivalent reciprocal recognition” and suggests “it is time for the EU to engage 
with important third countries seriously in order to develop a mutual recognition framework”104.  In 2007 
this matter was discussed at the EU summit, and has been shown to be the path of choice for Maijoor.  
Ng suggests as a minimum some form of ‘omnibus legislation’ so that the third country access issue is 
no longer dealt with in a piecemeal, directive by directive, fashion.  Others are more ambitious.  Merkel 
and Sarkozy clearly stated their ultimate goal in a letter to the Commission President in 2009: “The first 
priority is to build a new global financial architecture.  The European Union must assert a common 
position and take the lead on this.”105  To some, it seems inevitable that global securities regulation will 
finally be assumed by a supra-national body, equivalent to the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, and should that be the case, the current positioning of the EU could be interpreted as a 
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